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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
§ I.

Special Courses:
Does your law school offer courses which are of special interest to
minority group students? If so, please list.
Special Problems and/or Comments:
Please feel free to make any comments you might have as to special
problems your law school has had in regard to minority group programs
for students and also, any comments you may have in general.

§ J.

INSURANCE PREMIUM FINANCING
I. INTRODUCTION
As consumer protection has come into fashion, its legal aspects have become a favorite topic for analysis. One area of potential concern, insurance
premium financing, has not been legally explored. This lack of attention is
probably due to the emergence of premium financing and its gradual acceptance
by the consuming public only over the past decade.
This comment will consider the origin, mechanics, function, and legality
of various aspects of premium financing. For analytical purposes, it will be
divided into four basic sections. In the first two sections some fundamental
elements of insurance premium financing will be discussed. Consideration of the
evolution and validity of regulation will be set forth in the next section. Finally,
the comment will conclude with an analysis of some current controversies,
particularly the "cancellation tort-victim controversy."

II. SomE

FUNDAMENTALS OF INSURANCE
I

PREMiuM

FINANCING

A. Origin

The contemporary era can be characterized as an age of credit. Installment
credit is extensively used in purchasing durable consumer goods, and services,
and has become an integral part of the American economy. This general acceptance of installment buying is not new. The time-sale of automobiles and
television sets, and the revolving credit plans of most department stores were
the forerunners of the credit revolution. Today such diverse uses as church
donations, doctors' visits, bail, and city fees ranging from business licenses to
civic theater tickets can be made of credit cards. In some areas, even federal
income taxes can now be charged on bank credit cards."
It is hardly surprising that the payment of insurance premiums has also
been engulfed by the credit revolution. Insurance companies inaugurated this
development with their time honored policy of granting a discount if a term
policy premium was paid in advance. Under such a plan, five-year coverage
for four annual premiums, or three year coverage for two-and-a-half annual
premiums, was offered for full payment for the entire term made at the policy's
inception. This practice resulted in a benefit to the insurance company as well
as the insured since in addition to saving money by not having to issue a new
1.

Tna, Jan. 26, 1970, at 70.
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policy each year, the company obtained the benefit of increased investment
income. In the 1940's, a new plan, which still offered the discount but provided
for annual installments, was introduced. This development was the beginning
of what are known as deferred payment plans. Presently, insurance companies
provide for the payment of annual premiums on an installment basis for most
customers. Typically, the insured pays 40% of the annual premium at the
outset and two subsequent 30% installments.
Even with these plans, the payment of insurance premiums may still impose a heavy financial burden on the insured. Compulsory automobile liability
insurance or financial responsibility statutes2 virtually make insurance a requisite to earning a living. This is true not only for those who must drive as
part of their business, but also for those who rely on their automobiles for
transportation to and from their place of employment. Ever increasing automobile insurance rates, which reflect the radically rising costs of medical expenses and automobile collision repairs compound the financial burden caused
by compulsory insurance. Moreover, the adverse experience of insurance companies in underwriting automobile insurance forces many drivers to pay the
higher premiums of assigned risk plans.8 Under many of these plans the full
annual premium is due in a lump sum at, or shortly after, the inception of the
policy.
A number of insureds do not enjoy the best of credit, thus lending facilities
are not immediately available to help them meet their premium payments.
American business ingenuity, sensing the need inherent in this situation, set
out in search of a workable, and profitable, solution. As a result, premium
financing came into existence and has become a natural vehicle for insurance
premium payment.
Use of premium financing services is steadily increasing. Since 1962 the
amount of premiums financed in New York has doubled to over $100 million
per year.4 In 1966 more than 286,000 premium finance agreements were entered
into in New York state alone.5
B. Nature of Premium Financing
Financing insurance premiums necessarily differs from ordinary security
interest credit transactions.6 In ordinary security interest transactions, the
2. E.g., Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act, N.Y. VEn. & TRAP. LAW § 310 et seq.
(McKinney 1960).

3. E.g., N.Y. INs. LAW § 63 (McKinney 1966).
4. 1967 N.Y. SUP'T or BANxS AmN. REP. 136. Similarly, Virginia has seen a yearly
increase in financed premiums. There, in 1967, more than $12 million in premiums were
financed. Johnson, Problems in Premium Financing, BEST'S INSURANcE Naws, Oct. 1968, at
47. In North Carolina, premiums of $18 million or 5.3% of all the premiums written in
that state in 1965, were financed. Address by Edward L. Denton, Jr., Third Annual Insurance Premium Finance Seminar sponsored by the North Carolina Department of Insurance,
May 10-11, 1967 [hereinafter referred to as Denton speech]. Mr. Denton's speech has
served as a background for much of the material in this comment.
5. 1967 N.Y. SUP'T oF BANns Am. REP. 136.

6. See generally N.Y. 1J.C.C. Art. 9 (McKinney 1964).
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chattel to be purchased with the loan in question usually serves as collateral
to protect the lender's interest. If the borrower defaults in his installment
payments, the lender can foreclose on the chattel to protect his interest.
This kind of creditor protection, however, is not possible in insurance premium financing transactions. When an insurance contract is financed, owing
to the purpose for which the loan is given, no tangible security is involved
which may be subject to foreclosure upon default. What is actually financed
is an intangible-protection. As a result, a modified form of the standard
security interest used in ordinary credit transactions is required to protect the
interest of the financing agency. To accomplish this, the premium finance
agency obtains a power of attorney from the insured permitting it to effect
cancellation of the financed insurance contract in the event the insured defaults
in his installment payments. Coupled with this cancellation power, the finance
agency receives an assignment from the insured, of the unearned premium
payable under the insurance contract. In this manner, the finance agency
protects its investment in the event of the borrower's default.
The effectiveness of this technique requires that the financed insurance
contract be cancellable. Examples of such cancellable policies which are ordinarily financed today are auto, fire, theft, homeowners', workman's compensation, and inland marine. In addition larger premium finance agencies will
finance the expensive commercial package policies of a business concern. Such
policies often include all of the various types of insurance that the concern
requires for its successful operation.
Before a more detailed examination of premium financing is pursued, an
illustration of the ordinary premium finance transaction would be helpful. Suppose a hypothetical driver, reviewing his financial situation, concludes that
even under a 40-30-30 payment plan his automobile insurance premiums
totaling $300 annually have become an excessive financial strain. Assume further, that this driver lives in a state where automobile liability insurance is
compulsory. Thus, if the driver sees his driving privilege as an absolute necessity, his alternatives are automatically limited. Hence, he may decide to have
his insurance contract financed. He contacts his insurance broker (or agent)
and enters into a premium finance agreement 7 with him. Normally a down
payment of about 30% is required; say $100 in our hypothetical. According to
the standard agreement form, the hypothetical driver agrees to pay the broker
(the payee) six 8 $36 monthly installments in consideration for the payment of
the amount financed, here $200, to the insurance company. Included in these
$36 payments is a total finance charge of $16. As security for repayment, the
7.

"Premium finance agreement" means a promissory note or other written agreement

by which an insured promises or agrees to pay to, or to the order of, either a premium
finance agency or an insurance agent or broker the amount advanced or to be advanced
under the agreement to an authorized insurer or to an insurance agent or broker in payment
of premiums on an insurance contract, together with a service charge as authorized and
limited by law. N.Y. BANxIG LAW § 554(8) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
8. Installments are normally spread over periods ranging from four to nine months.
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insured assigns to the broker any unearned premium to which he may become
entitled under the policy. In addition, he agrees to pay a late charge of 57o of
any installment in default. If default results in cancellation of the insurance
contract, there will be an additional charge equal to the difference between
any late charge and $5. More importantly, the driver agrees that if default
occurs, he irrevocably appoints the broker his attorney-in-fact, authorized to
cancel the insurance contract. He also agrees that should the agreement be
referred to an attorney for collection, he will pay as attorney's fees 20% of
the amount due.
After this transaction has been completed, the broker will frequently
assign the agreement to a premium finance agency and the agency in turn will
forward to him the $200 that is being financed. The broker then remits the
total premium to the insurance company. Meanwhile, the insured driver receives a payment book from the finance agency and proceeds to make his $36
monthly payments.
Suppose that after making two such monthly payments the insured driver
defaults on his next monthly payment. Five days after the due date, the insured
will receive from the agency a notice of default and intent to cancel which
states that his insurance contract is to be cancelled in 13 days unless the
default is cured by payment. If the driver ignores this notice and 13 days
elapse, the agency will effect cancellation by notifying the insurance company.
Shortly thereafter the insurance company sends the agency the unearned
premium on the policy. From this sum the agency satisfies the insured's obligation to it. The insured, however, remains liable to the agency for any deficiency
in his account balance in the event the unearned premium is not sufficient to
satisfy the outstanding claim. As would logically be expected, the insured is
entitled to any unearned premium in excess of his account balance. 9
III. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Whether any particular feature of premium financing is favorable depends
on the interests of the party. Without question, premium financing is a headache for insurance companies because of the extra paper work that it entails.
Moreover, a fourth party has been brought into the picture meaning that
another opportunity exists for error in handling the account. For the finance
agency, however, premium financing represents a profitable enterprise. Perhaps
9. Upon the insured's default, premium finance agencies in the past have attempted to
bring suit against assigning brokers on the assigned note. Under the Uniform Commercial
Code such an action appears possible. N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-202(4) (McKinney 1964). In New
York, however, there is judicial authority to the effect that under its premium finance
statute such an assignment is implied to be without recourse unless the finance agency
and the broker mutually agree that the agreement is with recourse. Standard Premium Plan
Corp. v. Hirschorn, 56 Misc. 2d 687, 290 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Civ. Ct. of City of N.Y. 1968);
Standard Premium Plan Corp. v. Wolf, 56 Misc. 2d 522, 288 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Civ. Ct. of City
of N.Y. 1968). In both of these cases the statutory provision in issue was N.Y. BAqxmno
LAW § 566(2) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
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most importantly, premium financing allows many people to purchase insurance
which otherwise would be beyond their means.
All kinds of people avail themselves of premium financing. Most obvious
are those to whom it is a sheer economic necessity. Especially likely to be included in this category is the driver under 25 who because of his age faces
high insurance rates, or the driver subject to the higher rates of an assigned
risk plan. The businessman who has the large premiums of a commercial
package policy is another prospect likely to prefer spreading his payment over
the term of the policy; he too will often make use of a premium finance agency's
services.
The premium finance agency, existing as an independent enterprise, is
not the only available institution which finances insurance premiums. In some
communities, local banks provide premium financing. Many insurance agents
and brokers, licensed under state law likewise finance the premiums they
handle.' Several insurance companies also have set up installment payment
plans for premiums."
IV. STATE REGULATION

A. The History of Regulation
Relatively insignificant a decade ago, premium financing has become a
billion dollar business. Both the great number of people and the enormous
sums of money involved in premium financing point to the need for regulation.
As recently as ten years ago, there were no laws which regulated premium
finance agencies. As a result, obviously usurious plans were all too common. In
1960, a New York legislative committee studying insurance premium financing
reported that some finance agencies, without any statutory authority, were
charging insureds a simple interest equivalent of more than 26% per annum,
rates far in excess of those which other premium finance agencies were currently charging.' 2 Prior to the enactment of the Virginia premium finance law,
an agent is reported to have been collecting $6 per week from an insured, of
which more than $3 was an interest charge. 18
The oppressed insured, in demanding regulation of this unscrupulous
practice, was not alone in instigating state action. Many legitimate premium
10. A reduced license fee is often provided for insurance agents or brokers who finance
premiums the aggregate unpaid balance of which does not exceed a specified dollar amount.
E.g., N.Y. BANxnmG LAW § 566(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
11. While insurance company plans usually have much lower rates than those currently
charged by premium finance agencies, many agents and brokers, in spite of this price
advantage prefer not to use company plans because most often these plans are restricted
to premiums of the particular company offering the service. If an agent has more than
one company in his agency which have installment plans, this may mean many different
forms and procedures, all of which can be quite confusing as well as costly.
12. MEMORANDUMh! OF JOINT LEGISLATnr COmITTEE ON CO crCE AND ECONoIC
DEVELOPMENT, N.Y. LEGISLATIVE A.NUmAL 1960, at 46.
13.

47.

Johnson, Problems in Premium Financing, Bas.'s INsuaA'c

NEws, Oct. 1968, at
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finance agencies also sought permissive legislation because a state's general
usury statute, when applied to the premium finance industry, was often unduly
restrictive. The nature of the premium finance business dictates that most of
the accounts handled are relatively small. 14 When a general usury rate of 6%o,
for example, is applied to the small accounts of a premium finance agency, profit
ratios often will not match those of other legitimate businesses. Hence, there
evolved a movement from within the industry for authorization of a rate which
would yield a return more in line with that of other businesses.
Few states have responded to the call for legislation to specifically regulate
16
premium financing.' 5 The first state to pass such legislation was New York.
A primary reason for the New York Legislature's action was "the increasing
need for facilities for installment financing of insurance premiums occasioned,
in part, by the inability of many insureds to pay in one lump sum annual
premiums as high as $500 for compulsory automobile liability insurance.""' 7
It was the Legislative Committee's belief that premium finance regulation would
"fill a vacuum in the existing statutes and [would] further the interests of the
consumer, the public and both the underwriting and producing segments of the
insurance industry; and it would make insurance premium financing more
readily available to the consumer at fair rates and create a sound legal basis
for insurance premium financing in place of ... unregulated practices of doubtful legality."' 8 The Legislative Committee was informed that its proposed
legislation had the endorsement of the major segments of the premium finance
industry. 19
Following the New York example, several other states enacted specific
premium finance legislation. 20 As in New York, the proximate cause in North
Carolina was a compulsory automobile liability statute. In Maryland, which
has an Unsatisfied Judgment Fund contributed to by uninsured drivers, the
need for premium financing was caused by the fact that the uninsured motorist's
fee had reached about $80, which in some instances was higher than the cost
of automobile liability insurance. Under these circumstances, many vehicle
owners purchased insurance to avoid the uninsured motorist fee, made a small
14. The average size premium finance account in North Carolina in 1966 for example
was $106.09. Denton speech supra note 4. In New York, statistics reveal that a few years
ago 78.37o of all premium finance accounts were under $200. Id.
15. At present only ten jurisdictions have statutes governing premium financing. These
are: California, CAL. Fx. CA. § 18900 et seq. (West 1968); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE
ANN. § 35-1361 et seq. (1967) ; Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0990 et seq. (Supp. 1969) ; Illinois,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.60 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); Maryland, MVD. ANN. CODE
art. 48A, § 486A et seq. (1968); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANNt. § 17:16D-1 (Supp. 1969-70);
New York, N.Y. BA-NING LAw § 554 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); North Carolina,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-55 (Supp. 1969); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-1301 et seq.
(Supp. 1968); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-735 et seq. (Supp. 1968).
16. N.Y. BANK G LAw § 554 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
17. MEMORANDA Or JoiNT LEGISLATVE CommITTEE or ComEncE & EcoNoMnc DEvELoPmENT, N.Y. LEGISLATrVE ANDuA 1960, at 46.

18. Id. at 46-47.
19. Id. at 47.
20. See note 15 supra.
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down payment, and, after obtaining their registration plates, permitted the
insurance to be cancelled. In light of such developments, the Maryland General
Assembly decided that premium finance agencies should be regulated; in
1964, a law was passed.
As various states have considered premium finance statutes, premium
finance agencies, especially those that operate in more than one state, have
endeavored to minimize the difference between state laws. For these agencies,
a minimum of difference and variation among jurisdictions results in more
economical operations.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
recently considered premium finance regulation in the preparation of the Uniform Consumers Credit Code.21 The overall philosophy of the UCCC is that
"'credit transactions' is a single subject of law notwithstanding its many
facets." '22 In keeping with this philosophy, the Conference decided that the
UCCC would contain no distinctive rules for insurance premium loans as opposed to ordinary consumer loans. It concluded "that the [general] provisions
of the Act may appropriately be applied to insurance premium loans."2 3
That the Conference reached this decision seems unfortunate, for the differences between insurance premium loans and other consumer loans appears to
warrant distinctive rules for premium financing. In addition to the fundamental
2-4
difference between the two in terms of the lender's security protection device,
there are other more subtle variances that appear to require specific statutory
attention. Primary among these is the inclusion in premium finance transactions
of a third party, the broker or agent, not generally found in other types of
consumer loans. Regulation of the relationship of this third party to both the
borrower (the insured) and the lender (the finance company) is desirable. In
addition, specific rules governing cancellation charges would be beneficial to
all parties. Moreover, if the interests of potential third party automobile accident victims are to be considered, detailed regulation of cancellation proce25
dures appears crucial.
Little difference in substance exists among the limited number of premium
finance statutes presently in effect. New York's well drafted statute, has served
as a basis for the statutes of several other states. Fundamental to any understanding of premium finance regulation is an awareness of the typical substantive provisions in premium finance statutes. The New York statute will serve
26
as a suitable model here.
All premium finance statutes include a licensing provision. The New York
21. 1 P-H 1969 Consumer and Commercial Credit-Installment Sales i 12,103 ct seq.
[hereinafter referred to as UCCCJ.
22.

Id. ff 12,103

(official comment).

23. Id. ff 12,523 (official comment 4).
24. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
25. See text accompanying notes 60-72 infra.

26. For a more detailed summary of the New York statute see 43 N.Y. Ju., Pawnbrokers and Money Lenders § 43 ff (1965).

COMMENTS
statute provides that no person 27 shall engage in the business of premium
financing without a license obtained from the superintendent of banks. 28 Among
the states that have premium finance statutes, similar criteria have been established as prerequisites to the acquisition of a license. The New York statute
typically maintains that "the financial responsibility, experience, character,
and general fitness of the applicant or any person associated with the applicant
must command the confidence of the community and warrant the belief that
the business will be conducted honestly, fairly, and efficiently within the purpose and intent" of the statute. 29 An insurance agent or broker may be licensed
as a premium finance agency, and a reduced license fee is permitted where the
license application states that the aggregate unpaid balance of all premium
finance agreements to be held by such applicant will-not exceed a stated sum.80
The superintendent of banks is authorized to revoke or suspend any license
31
upon a finding of certain specific statutory violations.
To reinforce the licensing provision in New York, a distinct statute directed
at the insurer dictates that an insurer or its agent may not knowingly accept
payment of premiums for an insurance contract financed under a premium
finance agreement from any person, firm, or corporation not authorized to
engage in premium financing in accordance with the Banking Law.82 It further
states that an insurer cannot honor a power of attorney to cancel an insurance
contract except in accordance with the cancellation provisions of the premium
finance statute.83
The superintendent is authorized by statute to make rules and regulations,
conduct hearings, and make such orders and findings as may be necessary for
the proper conduct of business by insurance premium finance companies, and
for the enforcement of the statutory provisions regulating premium financing.3 4
In addition, he has authority to make such investigations as he deems necessary to determine whether any licensee has violated the statute,3 5 and to make
examinations of books, records, and accounts used in the business of any
licensee to determine whether any statutory violations have taken place.8 6 Pursuant to his investigative power, the superintendent, or any person designated
27. Excepted from the requirements of this provision are banks and authorized insurers. N.Y. BANxmnG LAW § 555(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
28. N.Y. BrxINO LAws § 555 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); cf. ILL. A!ar. STAT. ch. 73,
§ 1065.62 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 17:16D-4 (Supp. 1969-70).
29. N.Y. BANx GOLAW § 556(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); cf. ILL. ANN. STAT.
§ 1065.64 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. Ai~r. § 17:16D-4 (Supp. 1969-70).
30. N.Y. BANKInG LAW § 566(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
31. Id. § 559. Among these violations are: failure to pay the annual license fee; failure
to comply with any lawful demand, ruling, or requirement of the superintendent; violation
of the Federal "Truth-in-Lending Act." Cf. LL. ANN. STAT. § 1065.65 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1970); N.J. STAT. AN. § 17:16D-6 (Supp. 1969-70).

32. N.Y. INs. LAW § 153(2)

(McKinney 1966).

33. Id. § 153(3).
34.

N.Y. BANxnG LAW § 561 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); cf. CAL. FIN. C.A. § 189.20

(West 1968).
35. N.Y. BANxING LAW § 560(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).

36. Id. § 560(2).
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by him, may subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, and compel by order or
7
subpoena the production of books, records, and accounts.
In addition to close administrative control of licensees, almost all of the
various regulatory statutes presently in effect govern the form and content of
premium finance contracts. A premium finance agreement must be in writing
with a minimum print-size required.38 The writing must contain the entire
agreement"9 as well as certain wording set forth in the statute. 40 Moreover, the
New York statute incorporates by reference the Federal "Truth in Lending
when it
Act". 41 No premium finance agreement can be signed by an insured
V 42
contains any blank space to be filled in after it has been signed.
A maximum service charge of "ten dollars per one hundred dollars per
annum" and a minimum service charge, varying from $8 to $15 depending on
the number of monthly installments, is provided for.43 In the event of default
on an installment for a period of not less than five days, a delinquency charge
not in excess of five per cent of the installment or five dollars is allowed on
each installment in default. 44 Further, if the default results in cancellation of
a financed insurance contract, a cancellation charge "equal to the difference
between any delinquency and collection charge imposed in respect to the installment in default and five dollars" is permitted. 45 A premium finance agreement may also provide for the payment of attorney's fees not exceeding 20 per
cent of the amount due if the agreement is referred to an attorney for collection.46
Many financed insurance contracts are for automobile liability insurance.
Due to the possible adverse ramifications of cancellation of this type of insurance both to the insured and to potential innocent tort victims of the insured,
premium finance statutes generally require strict procedures for cancellation
of insurance contracts. When a premium finance agreement contains a provision
permitting cancellation by a power of attorney, the insurance contract cannot
be cancelled unless effected in the statutory manner. 47 Among the statutory
requirements that must be complied with to effect cancellation are: (1) that
37.
38.
ANN. §
39.
40.

Id. § 562.
Id. § 567(1); cf. ILL. ANx. STAT. § 1065.66 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT.
17:16D-9 (Supp. 1969-70).
N.Y. BANnG LAW § 567(2) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
Id. § 567(2). The wording is as follows: "NOTICE: 1. Do not sign this agreement

before you read it or if it contains any blank space. 2. You are entitled to a completely
filled in copy of this agreement. 3. Under the law, you have a right to pay off in advance
the full amount due and under certain conditions to obtain a partial refund of the service
charge."
41. Id. § 567(3) (b). The "Truth-in-Lending Act" is basically a disclosure statute.
42. Id. § 567(4).
43. Id. § 568(4)(a); cf. ILL. Aw. STAT. § 1065.67 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); N.J.
STAT. AiNt. § 17:16D-10, 12 (Supp. 1969-70).
44. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 569(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).

45. Id.
46. Id. § 569(2).
47. Id. § 576(1); cf. CAL. Fnr. CA. §§ 18923-18926 (West 1968); ILL. STAT. ANN.
§ 1065.68 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16D-13 (Supp. 1969-70).
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ten days unconditional notice be served upon the insured before his insurance
be cancelled; (2) that if this notice is served by mail an additional three days
be allowed; (3) that the notice of cancellation include in type or print of at
least twelve points, a statement that if the insurance involved is motor vehicle
liability insurance, proof of financial security is required to be maintained
continuously throughout the registration period, and that failure to maintain
proof of such financial security requires revocation of the registration of the
motor vehicle, unless the registration certificate and number plate of such
vehicle have been surrendered to the commissioner of motor vehicles prior to
the time at which cancellation becomes effective; (4) that all statutory, regulatory, and contractual restrictions providing that the insured may not cancel
his insurance contract unless he or the insurer first satisfy such restrictions by
giving a prescribed notice to a governmental agency, or an individual designated
to receive such notice for said governmental agency, shall apply; (5) that the
insurer within a reasonable time after cancellation returns whatever gross
unearned premiums are due under the contract to the premium finance agency
for the benefit of the insured; (6) that, subject to exception,48 upon the cancellation of motor vehicle liability insurance by a premium finance agency,
notice of the cancellation must be filed by the insurer with the commissioner
of motor vehicles not later than thirty days following the effective date of such
49
cancellation.
For violation of any provision of the premium finance statute misdemeanor
criminal sanctions are authorized.50 Moreover, a premium finance agency which
knowingly charges more than authorized, forfeits all charges which the premium
finance agreement carries; if a greater charge is in fact paid by an insured,
he is entitled to double damages from the premium finance agency. 51
B. The Validity of Regulation
That a state may in the exercise of its police power regulate interest
rates5 2 and require money lenders to obtain a license as a condition to carrying
on business53 is firmly established. Further, reasonable state regulation of the
48. An insurer is not required to file a notice of cancellation where the insurer has been
advised by the commissioner that such insurance has been superseded by another insurance
contract which took effect at or prior to the time at which termination became effective,
or where the insured has surrendered his registration certificate and number plates to the
commissioner and has delivered to the insurer a copy of the notice indicating surrender at
or prior to the time at which the termination became effective. N.Y. Vax. & TRAP. LAw
§ 313 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
49. N.Y. BAi'T=G LAW § 576(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
50. N.Y. BA=nGo LAw § 563(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).

51. Id. § 563(2).
52. Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941); Mack
Inv. Co. v. Dominy, 140 Neb. 709, 1 N.W.2d 295 (1941).
53. Ex parte Fuller, 15 Cal. 2d 425, 102 P.2d 321 (1940); Berry v. Fort Worth, 110
S.W.2d 95 (Ct. of Civ. App. of Tex. 1937); Dunn v. City of Hoboken, 85 N.J. Law. 79, 88
A. 1053 (1913); Dewy v. Richardson, 206 Mass. 430, 92 N.E. 708 (1910).
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small loan business in the public interest is not violative of due process of

law.

54

Because the development of premium financing and the limited legislation
that has slowly evolved with it are recent phenomena, there is very little
specific authority directly concerned with the validity of premium financing.
On principle, it would seem that a premium payment service plan entered
into between an insured and a finance company not so connected with the
insurer as to create conflicting interests would be valid and enforceable, providing the contract was fairly made and contained no provisions in conflict
with statutory regulations governing insurance contracts.55
Of the limited number of cases dealing with premium financing, the leading
case directly concerned with its validity indicates that where a premium
finance company is a third party, disinterested in the substance of the insurance contract, a premium finance agreement may be valid." Similarly, another
case intimates that premium finance agreements might validly be made, provided the insured's statutory rights with respect to notice of cancellation are
7
not violated.
Further authority dealing directly with the validity of premium financing
agreements is wanting. Yet, because premium financing is in many respects
similar to ordinary small loan transactions, case law on the latter, by analogy,
seems applicable to premium financing.
In New York, while the Court of Appeals has not passed directly on the
constitutionality of the Small Loans Act,58 it has approved the principle involved. 59 This approval may indicate that the constitutionality of Article
XII-B, the New York premium finance statute, is not in jeopardy. In fact, no
statute regulating premium financing has yet been declared unconstitutional
in any jurisdiction.
V.

CtURRNT CONTROVERSIES

A. Cancellation
Of the many ramifications of premium financing the cancellation feature
is probably most debatable. As previously mentioned, due to the potential
adverse consequence to third party accident victims, premium finance statutes
generally mandate compliance with strict procedures to effectively cancel a
financed insurance contract. 0 Nonetheless, some critics contend that these statutory procedures are not adequate to protect the interests of potential tort victims.
54. National Accounting Co. v. Dorman, 11 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Ky. 1935), aff'd,

295 U.S. 718 (1935).
55. See generally Annot., 115 A.L.R. 1212 (1938).
56. Kaufman v. Laughlin Co., 357 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1966); See also Chamberlain
v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 289 Mass. 412, 194 N.E. 310 (1935).
57. Clark v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 90 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1937).
58. N.Y. BANm1G LAW art. 9 (§§ 340-65) (McKinney 1950).
59. London Realty Co. v. Riordan, 207 N.Y. 264, 100 N.E. 800 (1913); Lowry v.
Collateral Loan Ass'n, 172 N.Y. 394, 65 N.E. 206 (1902).

60. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
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Those proponents who seek additional protection of such interests cite statistics
which indicate that there are a significant number of uninsured motorists. Even
in those states where liability insurance is compulsory the illegal presence of
an uninsured motorist is not all too infrequent. Thus, it is argued that the
public should not be subjected to the additional risk of uninsured injury inflicted by the driver who, because of a premium finance agency's cancellation
of his insurance contract, is uninsured.
In New York, where the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation0 ' has been established by the state to compensate the victims of uninsured
motorists, this problem appears nonexistent. In all other jurisdictions, those
who are insured under "Uninsured Motorist Endorsement" 62 will be similarly
protected. This protection, however, does not accrue to pedestrians, for instance,
who are not within the reach of the uninsured motorist coverage. With respect
to them the argument against cancellation remains relevant.
It seems apparent that the strict cancellation provisions in premium
finance statutes are, in part at least, a response to the problems that underlie
this argument. The courts, by strictly construing cancellation provisions, have
shared the legislature's concern in this regard. Statutory provisions dealing
with such aspects as the service of notice of cancellation upon the insured, 63
the timing of cancellation after notice, 64 the creation of a power of attorney to
cancel,0 5 and notification of the commissioner of motor vehicles of cancellation, 0 all have strictly been construed in favor of continuing the insurance
contract in effect. Yet, notwithstanding the rigid statutory cancellation provisions and their strict judicial interpretation, the proponents of the non-cancellation argument would go still further. Their goal is the total elimination of the
premium finance agency's power of cancellation.
Any attempt in this direction by means of a direct attack on the power
of attorney cancellation clause would prove fruitless. In addition to case law
holding that premium finance agreements are basically valid, 67 nothing in
agency or insurance principles prevents the insured from authorizing an agent
to cancel his insurance contract.0 8 This is so because cancellation is not an act
61. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation Law, N.Y. INs. LAW § 600
et seq. (McKinney 1966).
62. This is a special policy which is sold almost automatically to holders of automobile
liability insurance policies. It protects the insured against the risk of being hit by a negligent
uninsured driver. See Laufer, Insurance against Lack of Insurance? A Dissent from the
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 1969 DuKE L.J. 227 (1969).
63. Bogiolo v. Advocate Inc., 31 A.D. 2d 855, 297 N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dep't 1969).
64. Johnson v. General Mut. Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 42, 246 N.E.2d 713, 298 N.Y.S.2d 937
(1969).
65. Id., Rotsettis v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 58 Misc. 2d 667, 297 N.Y.S.2d 333
(Sup. Ct. 1967); General Mut. Ins. Co. v. Agents Serv. Corp., 26 A.D.2d 602, 271 N.Y.S.2d
428 (3d Dep't 1966).
66. Pitts v. Travelers Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 142, 298 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
MVAIC v. Davidson, 56 Misc. 2d 246, 288 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1968).
67. Kaufman v. Laughlin, 357 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

68. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Lund, 234 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1956); Sweers v. Malloy,
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so personal in nature as to preclude delegation in the absence of statutory
provision to the contrary.6 9 Hence, cancellation effected by an agent of the
insured is valid if he acts within the scope of his express or implied authority. 70
Moreover, the extension of credit and an agreement that the insured may pay
a premium finance agency in installments are sufficient consideration to support a power of attorney to effect cancellation.71 Most directly in point is a
North Carolina court's holding that the state's Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Act does not forbid cancellation of an insurance contract by an insured through
an agent.72
Thus, the limited number of cases in point indicate that the only possible
means of eliminating the cancellation power is by legislative fiat predicated on
the state police power. Ideally, a consideration of the consequences of such
legislative action should be determinative of whether it will be in the public
interest. Without the cancellation power the premium finance industry could not
function since this is its sole means of security. In a state where automobile
liability insurance is compulsory, the demise of the premium finance industry
would result in a curtailment of driving privileges for those drivers who, due
to economic necessity, must necessarily rely on premium financing. It is conceivable that such a development might prompt insurance companies to offer
installment payment facilities on a large scale. The public, however, would
bear the cost of such a service in the form of higher rates. Most importantly
of all, the innocent victim of an uninsured driver should be considered.
The issue of cancellation versus non-cancellation is one of conflicting interests. It is obvious that in considering such alternatives as the continuation
or elimination of the cancellation power these conflicting interests must be
balanced by the state legislature. The probabilities of the loss of driving
privileges, higher insurance rates, and injury to innocent parties by the uninsured must be contemplated. Then, the societal value placed on each of these
interests must be considered. A rational decision can be based only upon this
type of analysis. But in weighing competing interests in such a fashion a very
difficult process is involved, for what actually are being balanced are complex,
diverse intangibles. The key to any ultimate resolution will eventually lie in a
value judgment that must come from the state legislature.
28 A.D.2d 955, 281 N.Y.S.2d 693 (3d Dep't 1967); Apparel Mfrs. Supply Co. v. National
Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d 443, 11 Cal. Rptr. 380 (2d Dist. 1961).
69. Ryan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 202 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afJ'd, 308 F.2d 368
(2d Cir. 1962); Chamberlain v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 289 Mass. 412, 194 N.E. 301

(1935).

70. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 385 F.2d 826
(10th Cir. 1967); Stone v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 Misc. 2d 164, 242 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct.
1962).

71. Daniels v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 660, 129 S.E.2d 314 (1963).

72. Id., Dawson v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 192 N.C. 312, 135 S.E. 34 (1926).
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B. Other Issues
Without doubt premium financing has filled a public need, but in so doing
it has also created certain problems. In addition to the cancellation power
controversy discussed above, other lively issues exist.
"The purpose of regulating any financial institution is to permit a just
return, which will be adequate to insure the participation of legitimate business
concerns in the field and to provide assurance that the loan shark and other
illegitimate lenders will have no place in the lending picture."7 In permitting
small loan companies to charge interest rates in excess of the general usury
rate, the legislature has imposed a duty upon them to deal fairly with borrowers.7 4 Loans must be made with scrupulous adherence to the statute
authorizing them.75 For obvious reasons the degree of such scrupulousness is
closely guarded by both regulatory administrative agencies as well as the courts.
Moreover, because premium finance agreements are to be considered adhesion
contracts,7 they should be strongly construed against the dominant party who
77
has prepared and offered them.
The state's watchful supervision of premium finance agencies, if not
prudently exercised, however, can become detrimental to the very party for
whose benefit it is being implemented, since it is the consumer, the man who
finances his premiums, who ultimately pays the costs of over regulation.
At the inception of premium finance regulation, the unscrupulous practices
of many agencies left much to be desired. The remedial legislation enacted to
rectify this situation was often justifiably stringent. What may have been
laudatory regulation then, however, may not continue to be best in light of the
present state of the industry. For example, some states require that all forms
used by premium finance agencies must be filed and approved before they can
be used. This requirement applies even to form letters. While it may not be
unreasonable to require the approval of agreement forms by which an insured
makes certain agreements or commitments, the requirement of approval of all
forms, including form letters, is unduly-burdensome to the industry, and in the
long run penalizes the public in the form of higher costs.
Another significant issue relevant to contemporary premium financing is
concerned with delinquency and cancellation charges. Unfortunately, not all
insureds pay their obligations promptly. Upon default, it is standard practice
among premium finance agencies to send out delinquency and intent-to-cancel
73. Comment, Regulation of Financial Institutions in Missouryi, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J.
545 (1961).
74. Pollack v. Madison Long Island Personal Loan Co., 176 Misc. 78, 24 N.Y.S.2d
950 (N.Y.C.Mun. Ct. 1941).
75. Rosenblum v. Family Fin. Corp., 176 Misc. 1050, 39 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Sup. Ct. 1942),
aff'd, 266 A.D. 872, 43 N.Y.S.2d 636 (2d Dep't 1943).
76. The adhesion contract is a standardized form agreement that is drafted by a
dominant party and then presented to a weaker party as the only acceptable instrument.
RESTATEi=T (SzcoND) CoNxaicz oF LAWS § 332(a) (Tent.Draft No. 6,1960).
77. Associates Discount Corp. v. Greisinger, 103 F. Supp. 705 (W.D.Pa. 1952).
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notices. Because this practice adds to the operational costs of premium financing, most regulatory statutes permit agencies to impose a delinquency charge.
Some states, however, do not. In addition, some states permit a cancellation
charge if a default actually results in cancellation. Again, other states do not.
It is submitted that delinquency and cancellation charges should be permitted in all jurisdictions. In states where premium finance agencies are not
permitted a delinquency or cancellation charge, overall rates are higher in
order to offset the additional costs incurred due to delinquent insureds. The
insured who lives up to his financial commitments under a premium finance
agreement should not be obliged to pay the additional costs incurred by the
premium finance agency due to delinquent insureds. This can only be accomplished by allowing delinquency and cancellation charges.
Finally, there is one problem that from a public relations standpoint is
most objectionable to the agent who finances insurance premiums himself.
This is the Federal "Truth in Lending Law," 78 which requires in addition to
the expression of finance charges, in terms of dollar amounts, that finance
charges be expressed in bold print on the contract in terms of simple interest
at an annual rate.
The nature of premium financing dictates that accounts handled be relatively small. 79 To handle small accounts at a profit a minimum income is
necessary to cover costs. Such income in effect, is really a service charge. To
have it expressed in terms of an annual interest rate is very deceptive. This
point is illustrated by one writer:
When the amount involved is small and the payment terms are short,
time rate disclosure is meaningless and only dollar disclosure should
be required. For a merchant to tell his customer, who wishes to buy
a $60 vacuum cleaner on time, that it will cost him a minimum $10
credit service charge and a total time price of $70 payable in 8
monthly installments of $8.75 each, enables the customer to make a
value judgment as to whether or not he wishes to buy the cleaner on
those terms; for the merchant to tell him that the credit service charge
is at an annual rate of 29.63% does not help the customer in making
that judgment.80
A similar example will forcefully illustrate this point. Where, for example,
$34 is financed and is to be repaid in four monthly installments along with an
$8 finance charge, in order to comply with the "Truth in Lending Law," a
premium finance agency is required to indicate in bold print on the premium
finance agreement that the annual percentage rate charges is 110.5. Since
annual percentage rates are not always meaningful, maybe premium finance
agencies should not be required to display the effective rate on smaller size
loans but rather only the total dollar cost.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969).
79. See note 14 supra.
80. Buerger, Disclosure of Finance Charges in Credit Transactions, PzRsoAxL FnrANcr
LAw QuARTiEzy REPORT, Vol. 21, Spring 1967, at 46 (emphasis added).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Premium financing has developed as a distinct form of consumer credit to
meet a specific public need, but in many jurisdictions the law governing it has
sorely lagged behind. The diverse interests in need of protection, as well as the
sheer volume of capital involved, call for reasonable state regulation. With
such regulation this new industry can effectively function to the benefit of all
parties involved. Yet to accomplish this end there must first be an awareness
within the legal community of the nature of premium financing and the legal
ramifications that it entails.
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